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UNITED STATES JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE IN
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCIES
DOUGLASS G. BOSHKOFF*
MORE than 90 years ago, the American Law Review reported that a
multinational conference on international bankruptcy was to take place
in Holland. It added: "The Law Journal (London) does not seem to
think that the conference will lead to practical results." 1 This prediction
was accurate and the commercial world continues to wait for a rational,
co-operative approach to the administration of those insolvency pro-
ceedings whose impact cannot be confined within the borders of one
country. Each nation has its own scheme for dealing with the affairs of
debtors in financial distress. A cross-border insolvency implicates the
systems of more than one country. In theory, the law of a single jurisdic-
tion should control all aspects of the proceedings so that the administra-
tion of the estate can go forward in a rational and efficient manner.2 The
primacy of a single nation's law is, however, not easily achieved when
substantial interests of other nations and their citizens are involved.
Efforts to harmonise the operation of conflicting insolvency systems by
treaties have not been notably successful. 3 It remains, then, for individ-
ual nations, motivated by the desire to promote international co-oper-
ation and to avoid wasteful duplication of effort, to establish unilateral
procedures for the recognition of rights arising under foreign bank-
ruptcy 4 statutes.
A foreign administrator struggling to save or liquidate a business will
* Professor of Law, Indiana University. I am grateful for the research assistance of
Gregory Wooldridge, Class of 1988.
1. (1894) 28 Am.L.R. 581.
2. There are two separate issues: the establishment of a single centre of administration
and the reconciliation of competing principles of substantive law. The latter matter domi-
nates the discussion in reported decisions.
3. For example, members of the EEC have been unable to agree on the terms of a
bankruptcy convention. Gitlin and Flaschen, "The International Void in the Law of Multi-
national Bankruptcies" (1987) 42 Bus. Law. 307, 311-313; Woloniecki, "Co-Operation
Between National Courts in International Insolvencies: Recent United Kingdom Legis-
lation" (1986) 35 I.C.L.Q. 644.
The usefulness of treaties as a vehicle for international co-operation is questioned in J.
Dalhuisen, International Insolvency and Bankruptcy (1986) Vol.1, Part III, para.2.05[7].
The author also suggests that existing treaties have made it more difficult to resolve prob-
lems outside the scope of these treaties: idem, Part III, para.2.03[5], nn.74 and 75.
4. In the US, bankruptcy is a term commonly employed to refer to any proceeding
authorised by Title 11 of the US Code. Such proceedings involve either individual debtors
or business entities and can result in liquidation or rehabilitation. It is used in this article in
the same sense, referring to all types of insolvency proceedings.
(1987) 36 I.C.L.O.
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often wish to repatriate assets located in the United States, obtain dis-
covery or avoid fraudulent conveyances and preferences. The American
legal system has not been unresponsive to the need for international co-
operation. US law offers three options for achieving these objectives:
1. the use of remedies available under state5 law;
2. the commencement of a full bankruptcy case in the United
States; or
3. the commencement of an ancillary American administration in
aid of the foreign insolvency proceedings.
The first option is often of questionable use, particularly when assets are
widely dispersed. A full bankruptcy case, on the other hand, can be far
too expensive and a cumbersome remedial device. The last option, an
ancillary American administration, is a fairly recent innovation. Section
304 of the Bankruptcy Code, 6 a statutory provision which became effec-
tive on 1 October 1979, authorises "a case ancillary to a foreign pro-
ceeding". More modest in scope and less complex than a regular
bankruptcy, section 304 proceedings offer the possibility of an expedited
procedure which should be of interest to many foreign administrators,
particularly those appointed under English law.
This article examines each of these three options. It assumes that
some form of liquidation or rehabilitation proceedings have been com-
menced outside the United States and that a representative of one or
more creditors (a foreign administrator) needs American judicial assist-
ance. Repatriation of assets receives the greatest attention since it is the
relief most often sought by the foreign administrator.
I. USE OF NON-BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURES
AMERICAN courts are open to the foreign administrator who wishes to
gain control of assets located in the US. An action may be commenced
seeking a transfer of assets to the location of the original insolvency pro-
ceedings. 7 Alternatively, the foreign administrator can appear in pro-
5. State law (e.g. the law of New York or North Carolina) will determine both the pro-
cedure for asserting the claim of a foreign administrator and the degree of deference to be
accorded the foreign proceedings when the action is commenced in a state court. State law
will also determine the outcome of the controversy when the foreign administrator com-
mences an action in the US district court based upon diversity of citizenship. See text
accompanying nn. 16-23 infra.
6. 11 U.S.C. 304 (1983).
7. See e.g. Disconto Gesellschaft v. Umbreit 208 U.S. 570 (1908); Clarkson Co. Ltd v.
Shaheen 554 F.2d 624 (1976); Daniels v. Powell 604 F.Supp. 689 (N.D. 111.1985); Waxman
v. Keloha 296 F.Supp. 1190 (1969); In re Delehanty's Estate 11 Ariz. 366, 95 Pac. 109
(1908); Fincham v. Income from Certain Trust Funds of Cobham 193 Misc. 363, 81 N.Y.S.
2d 356 (1948).
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ceedings commenced by others and request the same relief. 8 Either
sequence of events should lead to the same substantive result. The court
will have to decide whether or not to defer to proceedings being con-
ducted elsewhere. A decision to defer is often characterised as a grant of
comity to the foreign proceedings. 9
Cunard Steamship Co. v. Salen Reefer Services AB,10 an important
recent decision, shows how the doctrine of comity can assist a foreign
administrator anxious to gain control of American assets. In Cunard,
American creditors had responded to the commencement of Swedish
insolvency proceedings by seizing assets of the debtor located in New
York. This was effected by obtaining an order for attachment of assets
from the US District Court for the Southern District of New York. The
Swedish interim administrator then entered an appearance and
requested the court to vacate the attachment so that the assets could be
distributed to creditors in accordance with Swedish law. The trial court
granted this request, finding "that the public policy of the United States
is best served by extending comity to the Swedish court's announcement
of Salen's bankruptcy... "" The Second Circuit affirmed the decision
8. See e.g. CunardS.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB773 F.2d452(2ndCir. 1985); In
re Stoddard 242 N.Y. 148, 1515 N.E. 159 (1926); In re Waite 99 N.Y. 433, 2 N.E. 440
(1885).
9. " 'Comity' summarizes in a brief word a complex and elusive concept-the degree
of deference that a domestic forum must pay to the act of a foreign government not other-
wise binding on the forum. Since comity varies according to the factual circumstances sur-
rounding each claim for its recognition, the absolute boundaries of the duties it imposes
are inherently uncertain. However, the central precept of comity teaches that, when poss-
ible, the decisions of foreign tribunals should be given effect in domestic courts, since rec-
ognition fosters international co-operation and encourages reciprocity, thereby promoting
predictability and stability through satisfaction of mutual expectations. The interests of
both forums are advanced-the foreign court because its laws and policies have been vin-
dicated; the domestic country because international co-operation and ties have been
strengthened. The rule of law is also encouraged, which benefits all nations.
Comity is a necessary outgrowth of our international system of politically independent,
socio-economically interdependent nation States. As surely as people, products and prob-
lems move freely among adjoining countries, so national interests cross territorial borders.
But no nation can expect its laws to reach further than its jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudi-
cate, and enforce. Every nation must often rely on other countries to help it achieve its
regulatory expectations. Thus, comity compels national courts to act at all times to
increase the international legal ties that advance the rule of law within and among nations.
However, there are limitations to the application of comity. When the foreign act is
inherently inconsistent with the policies underlying comity, domestic recognition could
tend either to legitimize the aberration or to encourage retaliation, undercutting the reali-
zation of the goals served by comity. No nation is under an unremitting obligation to
enforce foreign interests which are fundamentally prejudicial to those of the domestic
forum. Thus from the earliest times, authorities have recognized that the obligation of
comity expires when the strong public policies of the forum are vitiated by the foreign
act .... " Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
10. 773 F.2d 452 (2nd Cir. 1985).
11. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB 49 Bankr. 614, 618-19 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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and made these observations on the role of comity in cross-border insol-
vencies:
The rationale underlying the granting of comity to a final foreign judg-
ment is that litigation should end after the parties have had an opportunity
to present their cases fully and fairly to a court of competent jurisdiction.
The extending of comity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding, by staying or
enjoining the commencement or continuation of an action against a
debtor or its property, has a somewhat different rationale. The granting of
comity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding enables the assets of a debtor
to be dispersed in an equitable, orderly, and systematic manner, rather
than in a haphazard, erratic or piecemeal fashion. Consequently, Ameri-
can courts have consistently recognized the interest of foreign courts in
liquidating or winding up the affairs of their own domestic business
entities . . . It has long been established that foreign trustees in bank-
ruptcy were granted standing as a matter of comity to assert the rights of
the bankrupt in American courts . . . Although the early cases upheld the
priority of local creditors' attachments ... the modern trend has been
toward a more flexible approach which allows the assets to be distributed
equitably in the foreign proceeding.. .1
There was ample precedent for this ruling. In the late nineteenth cen-
tury, the Supreme Court in Canada Southern Railway Co. v. Gebhard
13
approved the extension of comity to foreign bankruptcy proceedings.
However-and this is an important qualification-application of the
principle of comity is only permitted, not required. This became clear 25
years later when a German creditor commenced an action in a Wiscon-
sin state court to reach funds allegedly deposited in a bank by a German
citizen. Insolvency proceedings had been commenced in Germany and
the plaintiff agreed to hand the proceeds over to the German estate. A
Wisconsin creditor then intervened and the state court granted it prior-
ity over the German creditor. On appeal, in Disconto Gesellschaft v.
Umbreit,1 4 the Supreme Court affirmed the decision, holding that it was
appropriate for the Wisconsin court to decide whether or not the doc-
trine of comity required recognition of the German bankruptcy.
There being, then, no provision of positive law requiring the recognition
of the right of the plaintiff in error to appropriate property in the State of
Wisconsin and subject it to distribution for the benefit of foreign creditors
as against the demands of local creditors, how far the public policy of the
State permitted such recognition was a matter for the State to determine
for itself. In determining that the policy of Wisconsin would not permit
12. 773 F.2d 452, 457-458. In Cunard the American claimant had not yet reduced its
claim to judgment. Victrix S.S. Co. v. Salen Dry Cargo AB 65 B.R. 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
reached the same conclusion when the creditor's claim had been reduced to judgment.
13. 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
14. 208 U.S. 570 (1908).
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the property to be thus appropriated to the benefit of alien creditors as
against the demands of the citizens of the State, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin has done no more than has been frequently done by nations
and States in refusing to exercise the doctrine of comity in such wise as to
impair the right of local creditors to subject local property to their just
claims. We fail to perceive how this application of a well known rule can
be said to deprive the plaintiff in error of its property without due process
of law.' 
5
Disconto leaves each state free to decide what, if any, type of co-oper-
ation will be forthcoming when a cross-border insolvency occurs. The
foreign representative accordingly runs the risk that applicable law will
favour local creditors. This risk 16 cannot be avoided by commencing an
action in the federal court system' 7 or removing a pending state court
case to the appropriate US district court.' 8 In Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins1 9 the US Supreme Court held that federal courts were
obliged to apply state law when the court's jurisdiction was based upon
the diverse citizenship of the parties. Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manu-
facturing Co.20 extended this ruling to choice of law rules. The recog-
nition of foreign insolvency proceedings is a matter of state law. 2
Federal judges are required to apply state comity concepts in diversity
litigation. 22 A uniform federal comity rule is not applicable until bank-
ruptcy proceedings have been commenced.2 3
15. Idem, p.580. The decision in this case prompted a protest by the German govern-
ment. Nadelmann, "The National Bankruptcy Act and the Conflict of Laws" (1946) 59
Harv.L.R. 1025, 1048 n.23.
16. It should be noted that all the recent reported litigation involving the effect of
foreign bankruptcies has occurred in the federal court system even when the foreign rep-
resentative has not sought to benefit from the provisions of the American bankruptcy stat-
ute. See e.g. in addition to Cunard, Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen 544 F.2d 624 (2nd Cir. 1976)
(action to compel transfer of corporate records); Daniels v. Powell 604 F.Supp. 689 (N.D.
I11. 1985) (action for conversion); Drexel Burnham Lambert Group v. Galadari 610
F.Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (action against foreign representative), affd. in part, vacated
and remanded in part 777 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1985); Kenner Prods. Co. (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(state court action removed to federal court prior to motion by foreign representative). No
doubt it is assumed that federal judges, more familiar with problems of cross-border insol-
vencies and less parochial in outlook, will be more sympathetic to the claim of the foreign
representative.
17. 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(2) (1983).
18. 28 U.S.C. 1441(a) (1983).
19. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
21. It has been suggested that a uniform federal rule should be applied to the recog-
nition of all foreign judgments, including those of insolvency courts, E. Scoles and P. Hay,
Conflict of Laws, para.24.35 n.5 (1982), but no case so holds.
22. Kenner Prods. Co. v. Soci&t9 Fonciere et Financiere 532 F.Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Daniels v. Powell 604 F.Supp. 689 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
23. Once full or ancillary bankruptcy proceedings are commenced, federal concepts of
comity should apply, although the US Supreme Court has never directly faced and
resolved this issue. See J. Moore, W. Taggart, A. Vestal and J. Wicker, Moore's Federal
Practice (2nd ed., 1985), Vol. 1A, para.0.325.
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II. COMITY AND RECIPROCITY
THERE is a pragmatic element in the decision to grant comity to a foreign
adjudication. International co-operation is advanced and American citi-
zens should eventually benefit from similar decisions by foreign courts.
This suggests an interesting question. Must the foreign representative
show that its jurisdiction, e.g. Sweden in the Cunard litigation, is simi-
larly willing to defer to an American bankruptcy? In Hilton v. Guyot24
the US Supreme Court held, by the narrow margin of five to four, that a
French judgment was not conclusive on the merits, being only evidence
of what the plaintiff sought to establish, because France would accord
similar treatment to an American judgment.
The reasonable, if not the necessary, conclusion appears to us to be that
judgments rendered in France, or in any other foreign country, by the
laws of which our own judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are not
entitled to full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this country,
but are prima facie evidence only of the justice of the plaintiffs' claim.
In holding such a judgment, for want of reciprocity, not to be conclusive
evidence of the merits of the claim, we do not proceed upon any theory of
retaliation upon one person by reason of injustice done to another; but
upon the broad ground that international law is founded upon mutuality
and reciprocity, and that by the principles of international law recognized
in most civilized nations, and by the comity of our own country, which it is
our judicial duty to know and to declare, the judgment is not entitled to be
considered conclusive.
25
Reciprocity is a controversial element of comity, not attracting
universal support.2 6 The Cunard court held that reciprocity was an
appropriate but not essential constituent of comity, to be considered
when deciding what relief should be extended in the case of a cross-bor-
der insolvency.
Cunard also argues that, since there is no indication that a Swedish court
would grant comity to a United States bankruptcy court under analogous
circumstances, the district court's granting of comity here was improper.
We find this contention without merit. In nations which share our ideals of
justice and concepts of procedural due process, it may almost be assumed
that a final judgment of one of our courts of competent jurisdiction would
be accorded deference. Nevertheless, while reciprocity may be a factor to
be considered, it is not required as a condition precedent to the granting
of comity...
24. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
25. Idem, pp. 227- 228 .
26. See Collier on Bankruptcy (15th ed., 1987), Vol.2, para.304.03; Huber, "Creditor
Equality in Transnational Bankruptcies: The United States Position" (1986) 19 Vand.J.
Transn.L. 741, 760; Nadelmann, "Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons
Taught by Herstatt and Company" (1977) 52 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1, 34-35; Powers and Mears,
"Protecting a US Debtor's Assets in International Bankruptcy: A Survey and Proposal for
Reciprocity" (1985) 10 N.C.J. Int.L.J. Com. Reg. 303, 346-350; Stevens, "The Interpe-
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Although Cunard has attempted to prove that a Swedish court would
not grant reciprocity or recognize bankruptcy proceedings in the United
States, Salen contends that a Swedish court would extend comity to a
bankruptcy proceeding here. Both parties seem to concede that an
equivalent situation has yet to be presented to a Swedish court. The
proofs submitted by the parties do not establish conclusively whether reci-
procity would be granted in Sweden. The district court did not decide this
issue because it found reciprocity not to be determinative.
We agree with the district court that, while reciprocity may in some cir-
cumstances be considered a relevant factor, proof of reciprocity is not
essential for the granting of comity...
Since reciprocity is not an essential element in granting comity, we hold
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the attach-
ment.
27
One suspects that the Cunard court would have been much less will-
ing to grant comity to the Swedish insolvency proceedings if there had
been proof that Sweden would not similarly extend recognition to an
American bankruptcy. 28 It should also be remembered that attitudes
towards all elements of the comity doctrine will vary throughout the
United States. Each state is free, therefore, to determine whether or not
reciprocity should be considered in reaching a decision on the comity
issue.
29
III. A FULL AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING
USE of non-bankruptcy procedures is not a practical alternative if assets
are widely dispersed throughout the US. Separate proceedings will be
necessary in each state where the debtor's assets can be found. Protect-
ing the foreign estate through individual actions will be time-consuming
and expensive. In this situation, the alternative of commencing normal
American bankruptcy proceedings should be considered. These are
effective beyond the borders of individual states and provide broader
relief than is obtainable from a single court.
American bankruptcy law authorises both voluntary and involuntary
proceedings. The Bankruptcy Code establishes certain requirements for
netration of Foreign Bankruptcy Laws in Domestic Proceedings Under H.R. 8200" (1978)
52 Am. Bankr. L.J. 61, 72-76; "Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: Has it Fostered the
Development of an 'International Bankruptcy System'?" (1984) 22 Col.J. Transp.L. 541,
556-557.
27. 773 F.2d 452, 460.
28. For another refusal to presume a lack of reciprocity, see In re Colorado Corp. 531
F.2d 463 (10th Cir. 1976).
29. Cf. Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Law, s.98, comment e (1971), which notes
that the court in Hilton did not decide whether the reciprocity rule was binding in litigation
based solely on state law. Since the decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins 304 U.S. 64
(1938), each state is free to decide whether or not it will follow Hilton and a number have
chosen not to do so: Scoles and Hay, op. cit. supra n.21, at s.24.35.
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each type of case. Only certain debtors are eligible for bankruptcy and
the eligibility requirements are slightly more demanding for involuntary
proceedings. 30 Furthermore, an involuntary petition must show that the
debtor is in financial difficulty. 3 1 The foreign representative should not
have much difficulty in establishing this condition. 32 Eligibility of
debtors has, however, been a problem in past cross-border insolvencies
and may well continue to raise troubling issues in the future.33
In 1974 the Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd was in financial diffi-
culty. It had assets in the US, although it did no banking business there.
Following attachment of these assets by American creditors, the bank
commenced bankruptcy proceedings in the US and also petitioned in
England for voluntary winding up. The objective of the American bank-
ruptcy proceedings was to deprive American creditors of the advantage
that they had obtained by moving quickly to secure writs of attachment.
These creditors argued that the petition was not well-founded because
the bank was not eligible for bankruptcy. The statute then in effect pro-
vided: "Any person, except a municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking
corporation or a building and loan association, shall be entitled to the
benefits of this title as a voluntary bankrupt [emphasis added]." 34
Literal application of this provision would have required dismissal of the
case. The Second Circuit 35 quite sensibly reached the contrary conclu-
sion. First of all, it noted that the American bankruptcy was ancillary to
the English winding up.
We take the bankruptcy proceeding here to be in aid of the order of the
High Court that the assets in the United States become available to the
creditors on the basis of equality. If the assets involved had been situated
in the United Kingdom, the High Court could have restrained and set
aside the attachment and judgment as having been made within six
months of the petition for winding up ... But the High Court, of course,
has no extraterritorial jurisdiction beyond the United Kingdom.
If there is jurisdiction to sustain the American adjudication in bank-
ruptcy of IBB, the American trustee will be in a position to bring a pro-
ceeding for avoidance of liens obtained by attachment or judgment within
30. Cf. 11 U.S.C. 109(b) (1983) (applicable to both types of proceedings) and 11
U.S.C. 303(a) (1983) (applicable only to involunary proceedings).
31. 11 U.S.C. 303(h) (1983).
32. It is not clear whether the foreign representative is required to prove a cessation of
payments in the US or whether it may also rely on defaults occurring in other jurisdictions.
See Honsberger, "Conflict of Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978" (1980) 30
Case W.L. Rev. 631, 648-649. However, the foreign representative need not demonstrate
a cessation of payments when a s.304 petition is filed.
33. Debtor eligibility can also be a problem when a petition is filed under s.304. See text
accompanying nn.48-53 infra.
34. Act of 15 June 1910, Chap.412, 36 Stat. 838, 839 (repealed 1979).
35. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd v. Fed. Deposit Ins.-Corp. 536 F.2d 509 (2nd Cir.
1976).
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four months of the filing of the petition if the bankrupt was insolvent at
the time . . . If there is no jurisdiction to entertain a voluntary bankruptcy
petition for IBB, the liens will be good and appellees will fare better than
United States creditors-among others.
36
The court then reasoned that the banking exclusion was intended to
preserve state liquidation procedures for domestic institutions and had
no relevance when the American bankruptcy court was merely assisting
the foreign effort to liquidate a foreign debtor.37 Congress later codified
the result in this case by amending the statute and authorising bankrupt-
cies for foreign banks with no American banking operations.3a The basic
issue raised by the IBB litigation, nevertheless, remains unresolved.
There are still some debtors who are not eligible for one or more types
of American bankruptcy proceedings. Farmers are exempt from invol-
untary bankruptcies39 and estates of deceased persons are wholly out-
side the domestic bankruptcy process.40 Other countries do not so limit
the operation of their insolvency systems. What result can be antici-
pated when a foreign representative files an insolvency petition concern-
ing a debtor not eligible for bankruptcy in the US? As long as the
American bankruptcy is only in aid of the foreign proceedings, the
effective administration of the entire pool of assets will best be advanced
by making the American bankruptcy process available even though the
debtor is not eligible for bankruptcy relief in the US. Failure to do so
will not assist in the implementation of any American bankruptcy
policy. Even if the bankruptcy case is dismissed, some court must decide
whether it is appropriate to co-operate with the foreign proceedings.
Dismissal of the American case only shifts the burden of making the
comity decision to another court and increases the difficulty of integrat-
ing the operation of the multiple legal systems that regulate the debtor-
-creditor relationship in a cross-border insolvency.
The overall desirability of avoiding dismissal is apparent when one
considers the relief available if the American bankruptcy is allowed to
go forward. The filing of the petition triggers a moratorium (automatic
stay) which effectively restrains individual creditors. 41 Through bank-
ruptcy, preferences can be avoided, including those resulting from the
36. Idem, p.511.
37. A full bankruptcy did not follow. The American proceedings were eventually sus-
pended and the assets were placed at the disposal of the English liquidator. The unre-
ported decision of the bankruptcy judge is reproduced in Nadelmann, "Israel-British
Bank (London) Ltd: Yet Another Transatlantic Crossing" (1978) 52 Am.Bankr. L.J. 369.
38. 11 U.S.C. 109(b)(3) (1983).
39. 11 U.S.C. 303(a) (1983).
40. In re Estate of Brown 16 Bankr. 128 (Bankr. D.C. 1981); In re Estate of Whiteside 64
Bankr. 99 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1986). Only "persons" are eligible for liquidation bank-
ruptcy: 11 U.S.C. 109(a) (1983). A decedent's estate is not a person.
41. 11 U.S.C. 362(a) (1983).
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attachment of assets by American creditors.42 Equally important is the
fact that most litigation concerning assets will be centralised in one
court, eliminating the need for the foreign administrator to appear in a
number of different courts.4 3
At the same time, full bankruptcy proceedings have some disadvan-
tages: they are complicated, time-consuming and costly. Furthermore, it
can be difficult to co-ordinate the administration of American proceed-
ings with foreign proceedings while, at the same time, conforming to the
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code. Consider the facts of Banque de
Financement SA v. First National Bank of Boston.44 Like the Israel-
British Bank, the debtor in this full American case was a foreign corpor-
ation with no business operations in the US. At the time of the Ameri-
can bankruptcy, it was also the subject of insolvency proceedings in
Switzerland. American law required the debtor to file a complete list of
creditors. To do so, however, would have violated Swiss law which pro-
hibits disclosure of the identity of depositors. Normally, American pro-
ceedings will be dismissed for failure to provide this information. The
Second Circuit refused to do so because the American proceedings were
necessary to avoid some pre-bankruptcy transfers of assets located in
the US and the court was convinced of the need for international co-
operation. The court indicated that it was willing to consider substitutes
for the normal scheduling procedures.45 This was a reasonable response
to the problem at hand. It might, however, have been better to transfer
the American assets to Switzerland for a unified administration.46
42. 11 U.S.C. 547(b) (1983).
43. For example, creditors who wish to obtain relief from stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
362(b) (1983) will generally apply to the bankruptcy judge in the judicial district where the
proceeding was commenced. See Collier, op. cit. supra n.26, Vol.1, para.3.02[2][a].
44. 568 F.2d 911 (2nd Cir. 1977).
45. "Flexibility in the international context of course should not come at the expense of
the orderly administration of the Act. Ordinarily the scheduling requirements must take
precedence even if preferences thereby are allowed to survive. Otherwise the administra-
tive and equitable purposes of the scheduling requirements themselves would be frus-
trated.
The instant case however is not an ordinary one. Aside from the policy considerations
mentioned above, it differs in two material respects from those cases in which the require-
ment of a complete list of creditors has been strictly enforced. The debtors in those cases
all sought relief from that requirement either without giving any compelling reason why
they should be relieved from the statutory burden of producing the information or without
offering any substitute means of satisfying the purpose of the requirement. At the eviden-
tiary hearing on the remand which we order here, Finabank may be able to comply in both
respects.
As for Finabank's reason for seeking relief from the creditors list requirement, its pur-
pose is not to obtain some advantage over its creditors. It seeks to protect them. Nor is it
attempting to pass on to a trustee the task of straightening out badly kept records. Fina-
bank is constrained by the criminal law of its domicile . . . " Idem, p.919.
46. 11 U.S.C. 508(a) (1983) provides a distribution rule when there are competing
bankruptcies in the US and a foreign jurisdiction.
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IV. COMMENCEMENT OF AN ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATION
IT is no easy task to synchronise the activities in two different bankrupt-
cies even though the court favours international co-operation. Much
effort will be duplicated if two full-scale proceedings are made to do the
work of one. Congress recognised the wastefulness of this cumbersome
practice when, in 1978, it authorised a new form of proceedings, less
comprehensive in scope, as an alternative to a full bankruptcy.
Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code authorises "a foreign representa-
tive", and no one else, to commence a "case ancillary to a foreign pro-
ceeding". The court to whom the section 304 petition has been
addressed is permitted to:
(1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of-
(A) any action against-
(i) a debtor with respect to property involved in such foreign
proceeding; or
(ii) such property; or
(B) the enforcement of any judgment against the debtor with respect
to such property, or any act or the commencement or continua-
tion of any judicial proceedings to create or enforce a lien against
the property of such estate;
(2) order turnover of the property of such estate, or the proceeds of such
property, to such foreign representative; or
(3) order other appropriate relief.
Thus the ancillary case can be a much less complex process, one
whose main objective is to assist and complement the foreign proceed-
ings. Some writers have hailed it as a substantial advance in the adminis-
tration of cross-border insolvencies.47 This may be too optimistic a view.
The details of a section 304 administration have yet to be settled by
judicial decisions. The new procedure will represent a significant
advance only if uncertainties in practice and statutory language are
resolved in a manner consistent with international co-operation.
Consider, for example, the matter of eligibility of debtors, an issue
already discussed in the context of a full bankruptcy. 48 The same issue
arose recently upon the filing of a section 304 petition on behalf of the
estate of a deceased insolvent. In Germany decedents' estates are
administered by insolvency courts. A contrary practice is followed in the
US where a decedent's estate may not be the subject of either voluntary
or involuntary proceedings. 49 Some heirs, whose claims had been
rejected by the German court, would nevertheless be entitled to Ameri-
can assets if Georgia probate procedures were allowed to run their
47. See e.g. Unger, "United States Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies" (1985) 19
Int.L. 1153, 1178-1183.
48. See text Part III supra.
49. See supra n.40.
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course. Not surprisingly, they questioned the propriety of an ancillary
administration. The court, in In re Georg,50 although noting that "there
are very strong grounds to exercise [bankruptcy jurisdiction] for the
sake of comity", dismissed the section 304 petition.
The court has carefully considered the briefs submitted by the parties on
this issue. From the facts before the court, there are very strong reasons to
exercise jurisdiction for the sake of comity. Here we have German
nationals, who have lost their appeals to assert their interests in Kaussen's
estate in the courts of the Federal Republic of Germany, turning to the
probate laws of the State of Georgia. In Georgia, they will receive what
they could not from their own home courts.
On the other hand, the court must work within the Bankruptcy Code as
it is written. A methodical examination of the definitions provided in the
Code leads the court to the unavoidable conclusion that one must qualify
to be a "debtor" under the Code before this court can exercise its jurisdic-
tion pursuant to section 304. In the United States, each state has a system
for liquidating and disposing of the estates of deceased persons. This
includes those of United States citizens as well as those of foreign
nationals. By not including probate estates as entities eligible for relief
under the Bankruptcy Code, Congress deliberately chose these State sys-
tems for disposing of property in probate estates over the national bank-
ruptcy system provided for in the Code. The court is unable to find any
authority to demonstrate that Congress intended to make an exception for
foreign probate estates...
In the instant proceeding, if comity was the only factor to be con-
sidered, this court would not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction. As the
facts now appear before the court, this is mainly a contest between the
German bankruptcy trustee and Kaussen's heirs. The heirs have lost in
their own home courts and are now pursuing their claims in a more
favourable forum, to wit: the Probate Court of Fulton County, Georgia. It
does seem to be a great affront to the principles of comity to allow this to
occur. However, this court is convinced that it is unable to exercise its jur-
isdiction to enforce the orders of the German courts because the drafters
of the Code intended that an entity must qualify to be a "debtor" under
the Code before relief can be entered pursuant to section 304. It is an
unfortunate result in this particular case under these particular circum-
stances, but, as a general policy, the court sees the wisdom in deferring to
the State court probate systems in handling decedents' estates.5 1
This decision is clearly incorrect. The section 304 proceedings exist only
as a procedural device to permit co-operation with another jurisdiction.
50. In re Klaus Hubert Georg 64 Bankr. 321 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986). The holding in
this case is anticipated in Klocker, "Foreign Debtors and Creditors Under United States
and West German Bankruptcy Laws: An Analysis and Comparison" (1985) 20 Texas
Int.L.J. 55, 90. Angulo v. Kedzep Ltd 29 Bankr. 417 (S.D. Tex. 1983) assumes that debtor
eligibility is a prerequisite to relief under s.304 and holds that this requirement is satisfied.
Universal Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gee 53 Bankr. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) rejects this
position, holding that the foreign representative need only show residence, domicile, place
of business or assets in the US.
51. In re Klaus Georg, idem, pp.324-325.
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There is no debtor, in the sense that the term is used in the American
bankruptcy statute, and eligibility should not be a matter of concern.
Israel-British Bank52 reached this conclusion in an analogous situation
and should not be forgotten.5 3
If the court had reached the opposite result, holding that the section
304 procedure was applicable to a foreign decedent's estate, it would
then have had to rule on the disposition of the American assets. It is not
certain that the German representative would have prevailed. Section
304(c) sets forth guidelines for granting whatever relief has been
requested. Nevertheless, this ultimate issue should have been resolved
in section 304 proceedings. The ruling in this case only transfers to
another court the burden of choosing between the American and Ger-
man distributional schemes.
Eligibility of debtors is not likely to be an issue in most section 304
proceedings. Hence, if only the facts of the Georg litigation are con-
sidered, the decision is not very significant. However, there is a more
fundamental issue in this case, one whose resolution is profoundly
important to the continuing development of co-operative attitudes
toward the administration of cross-border insolvencies. To what extent
will American courts be willing to co-operate in the administration of
foreign proceedings conducted under statutes which are markedly dif-
ferent from the American Bankruptcy Code? Is complete conformity
between the two legal systems to be required? Significant international
co-operation is unlikely if American courts defer to foreign proceed-
ings only when those bankruptcies are conducted in the same manner
and on the same terms as American proceedings. What result can be
anticipated when the foreign insolvency representative does not
resemble its American counterpart? It is possible that some foreign
administrators will be unable to convince American courts that they
are entitled to the benefit of an ancillary administration. Section 304
proceedings can only be commenced by a "foreign representative".
54
Such a representative must be appointed in a "foreign proceeding"
55
which is, in turn, defined as:
... a proceeding, whether judicial or administrative and whether or not
under bankruptcy law, in a foreign country in which the debtor's domicile,
residence, principal place of business, or principal assets were located at
the commencement of such proceeding, for the purpose of liquidating an
52. 536 F.2d 509 (2nd Cir. 1976).
53. As Collier, op. cit. supra n.26, at para.304.01, points out, "[The] administration of
foreign decedents' estates ... [under s.304] would not give rise to the federalism concerns
that prompted . . . [Congress] to leave domestic administration of decedents' estates to
the states."
54. 11 U.S.C. 304(a) (1983).
55. 11 U.S.C. 101(23) (1983).
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estate, adjusting debts by composition, extension, or discharge, or effect-
ing a reorganization.
56
Petitions filed by administrators, 57 the official receiver, 58 trustees in
bankruptcy 59 and liquidators60 should create no special problems of
definition. Although having different titles, these officials perform func-
tions in their insolvency systems which are recognisable and comprehen-
sible to American lawyers. The receiver appointed under a floating
charge,61 on the other hand, can anticipate a less sympathetic reaction
to a request for relief. The concept of a judicially appointed liquidator,
acting in a fiduciary capacity in the interest of all unsecured creditors, is
central to American bankruptcy law. It is predictable that some Ameri-
can judges will be reluctant to authorise co-operation with foreign pro-
ceedings when those proceedings, and the official in control of them, are
not substantially similar 62 to a domestic bankruptcy under the control of
an American-style bankruptcy trustee. Indeed, Collier, the leading
American authority on bankruptcy law, without considering the pur-
pose of section 304 proceedings offers the opinion that: "The definition
of a 'foreign representative' would not appear to be broad enough to
include the private appointment of a receiver and manager upon crystal-
lization of a floating charge under Canadian or English law." 63
Notwithstanding Collier's view, the better practice would be to permit
a receiver appointed under a floating charge to commence section 304
proceedings. No American bankruptcy policy will be advanced by refus-
ing to do so. Once this type of receiver has been appointed, liquidation
will take place64 and American courts, in one way or another, need to
56. 11 U.S.C. 101(22) (1983).
57. Insolvency Act 1986, s.8(2).
58. Idem, s.399(1).
59. Idem, s.305.
60. Idem, s.95.
61. See generally Palmers Company Law (1982), Vol. 1, Chap.44.
62. This is not a uniquely American problem. The process of comparing legal systems
will also have to be pursued when a court is asked to apply s.426 of the Insolvency Act
1986. See Woloniecki, op. cit. supra n.3, at pp.649-651 where the author urges application
of the liberal approach of Re A Debtor [1981] Ch. 384. Nevertheless, he questions whether
proceedings under 11 U.S.C. 1101-1174 (1983) are entitled to recognition under this pro-
vision. Idem, p. 650 n.48. Anticipating this problem, it has been suggested that the
appointment of an administrator should be tolerated or encouraged by the holder of a
floating charge when assets are located in foreign jurisdictions: J. R. Lingard, Corporate
Rescues and Insolvencies, (1986), para. 10.31; Cork Gully, Administrative Orders: A guide
to the implications of the procedure, (1986) p. 8 .
63. Collier Bankruptcy Practice Guide (1986), Vol.2, para.19.04[1]. Honsberger, op.
cit. supra n.32, at p.652 agrees.
64. Two courts have been willing to regard the receiver appointed under a floating
charge as a liquidator even though that official nominally acts to protect the interest of one
creditor, Clarkson Co. v. Rockwell Intl. Corp. 441 F.Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1977) allows
the receiver to proceed as a plaintiff, rejecting the contention that American public policy
requires that Canadian insolvency procedures mirror those existing in the United States.
"Defendant's only real policy objection is that some creditors-to the court's know-
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consider whether comity will be extended to the foreign activity.
Nothing is gained by narrowly construing the statute and denying the
foreign receiver access to section 304 proceedings. Such a denial merely
transfers the burden of determining the appropriate course of action to
another forum.65
V. RELIEF AVAILABLE IN SECTION 304 PROCEEDINGS
THE relief available in section 304 proceedings is not identical to that
which can be obtained following the commencement of a full bank-
ruptcy. The filing of a regular bankruptcy petition automatically
imposes a moratorium on all creditors. However, no automatic stay
exists when a petition is filed under section 304.66 The foreign represen-
tative must take the initiative and obtain a court order enjoining a speci-
fic creditor or creditors. Such relief is clearly authorised by section
304(b)(1). The court is also authorised to "order other appropriate
relief". It has been decided without discussion that a Canadian rep-
resentative was entitled in section 304 proceedings to challenge a prefer-
ence. 67 Another decision recently granted a request for discovery
following the institution of liquidation proceedings in the Grand Cay-
man Islands.68
ledge exclusively Canadians-may be prejudiced by the use of a method for dealing with
insolvency which, though fully acceptable in Canada, may afford somewhat less protection
for their interests than would be available pursuant to insolvency proceedings conducted
in the United States. Such variances in the law do not justify a refusal to countenance an
action on grounds of public policy unless enforcement of the foreign right would be preju-
dicial to recognized standards of morality or to the general interests of California citi-
zens .. Here, no effect on California citizens, except as discussed above, has been
alleged. Nor are the Canadian procedures offensive to any abstract standard of morality or
justice. Although not a fiduciary, Clarkson has an obligation to conduct the litigation in
good faith and to take reasonable steps to obtain the best recovery possible . . .More-
over, a Clarkson Vice President has stated under oath that Clarkson will apply to a Can-
adian court for direction as to the proper disposition of any surplus recovery . . .Under
these circumstances, the differences between United States and Canadian law are hardly
sufficient to warrant a dismissal on any ground of public policy." Idem, pp.796-797.
Hammond Screw Machinery Co. v. Sullivan 580 F.Supp. 24 (N.D. Ill. 1984) analogises
an English receiver to an assignee for the benefit of creditors and refuses to allow the set-
off of claims acquired by the defendant after the appointment of the receiver.
Both these decisions are consistent with the view that a receiver appointed under a float-
ing charge should be allowed to commence s.304 proceedings.
65. See also Huber, op. cit. supra n.26, at p.752, arguing, in a different context, that:
"The drafters of the Code could not have intended foreign law to be a 'mirror image' of
United States law because such a strict prerequisite would render s.304 ineffective."
66. 11 U.S.C. 362(a) (1983) only provides an automatic stay for petitions filed under
s.301 (voluntary cases), s.302 (joint cases filed by husbands and wives) and s.303 (involun-
tary cases). The foreign representative who wishes to obtain the benefit of the automatic
stay is, by the terms of s.303(b)(4), qualified to file an involuntary petition.
67. In re Comstat Consulting Servs. 10 Bankr. 134 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); Universal
Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gee 53 Bankr. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (dictum).
68. Universal Casualty ibid. Angulo v. Kedsep Ltd 29 Bankr. 417 (S.D. Tex. 1983).
agrees.
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While the language of section 304 is clearly consistent with the result
in each of these cases,69 venue rules70 may indirectly limit the avail-
ability of such relief. 28 U.S.C. 1410(c) establishes a link between venue
rules and the relief sought in the ancillary proceedings. When the
foreign representative seeks either to discover assets or avoid pre-bank-
ruptcy transfers, the proceedings can be commenced "only in . . . the
district in which is located the principal place of business in the United
States, or the principal assets in the United States, of the estate that is
the subject of such case". The statute apparently does not provide an
appropriate venue for actions related to bankruptcies in which the
debtor neither does business in the US nor has admitted assets there.
Possibly, courts will permit discovery and authorise actions to recover
preferences in the expectation that the correctness of the venue can be
established retroactively.7 '
A different problem will exist if the object of the section 304 proceed-
ings is to protect clearly identified American assets of a foreign debtor.
The venue rules found in 28 U.S.C. 1410 operate to reduce the useful-
ness of ancillary administration when these assets are located in more
than one judicial district. 28 U.S.C. 1410(b), for example, requires that
when the foreign administrator attempts to enjoin the enforcement of a
lien, the proceedings must be commenced in the "district in which such
property is found".
Let us assume that the foreign representative wishes to obtain control
over assets located in Nevada and North Carolina. Two separate section
304 proceedings are initially required.7 z It will be possible to attempt a
subsequent consolidation in one district. 73 The cost and delay associated
with motions to transfer proceedings may make consolidation impracti-
cal. Therefore, in insolvencies where assets are located in more than one
state a foreign representative will wish to consider the alternative of a
full American bankruptcy commenced where the debtor has its "princi-
pal assets in the United States". Multiple proceedings will not then be
necessary since the court where the original proceedings are com-
menced will be in a position to control the debtor's American assets no
matter where they are located.74
69. Also In re Egeria Societa Per Azioni di Navigazione 26 Bankr. 494 (Bankr. E.D.
Va. 1983). The view that avoidance powers can be asserted in s.304 proceedings is criti-
cised in Gitlin and Flaschen, op. cit. supra n.3, at pp.318-319.
70. 23 U.S.C. 1410 (1983).
71. There is language in Universal Casualty & Surety Co. v. Gee 53 Bankr. 891 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1985), suggesting that discovery may go forward in the hope that assets will be
identified. Note, however, that the presence of other assets and a place of business in the
US in that case satisfied the venue rule of 28 U.S.C.. 1410(c) (1983).
72. Collier, op. cit. supra n.26, Vol. 1, at para.3.02[3][b].
73. 28 U.S.C. 1412 (1983) authorises transfer of proceedings to another court "in the
interest of justice or for the convenience of the parties".
74. See supra n.43.
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VI. TURNOVER OF ASSETS
THE ultimate test of willingness to co-operate occurs when the court is
asked to authorise a transfer of American assets so that they can be inte-
grated with other assets in foreign proceedings. At best this will incon-
venience American creditors who must now advance their claims many
miles from home. Some small claimants will find it uneconomical to do
so. Those with larger claims may find that they do not enjoy as favour-
able a status as that provided by American law. This visible and immedi-
ate damage to American interests must be balanced against the less
tangible and more long-range interest in moving toward greater inte-
gration of different insolvency systems. As already noted, section 304
lists the factors to be considered when ruling on the requests to transfer
assets. While there are several reported decisions applying the statutory
criteria, the results are conflicting and it is too early to conclude that the
trend of decisions is firmly established.75
In re Toga Mfg. Co. 76 represents the least co-operative position.
Bankruptcy Judge Graves flatly refused the request of a Canadian bank-
ruptcy trustee for the transfer of $215,000 which had been seized under
a writ of garnishment to satisfy the claim of a Michigan creditor. It was
conceded that Hesse (the creditor):
would suffer no inconvenience if it were forced to litigate its claim in
Canada. The courts of the Province of Ontario are readily available to
Hesse in order that it may attempt to protect its interest there. Hesse
would receive just treatment of its claim against Toga in the Canadian
courts. Upon distribution of the proceeds of the estate under Canadian
bankruptcy law, however, Hesse's claim will not receive the priority rec-
ognition "substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this
title" as required by section 304(c)(4) [emphasis in original].77
Accordingly, the request for transfer was denied because:
This court must protect United States citizens' claims against foreign judg-
ments inconsistent with this country's well-defined and accepted policies.
Trustee Peat Marwick Ltd conceded that Hesse's secured status as it exists
under this country's laws would not receive the same or substantially simi-
lar treatment under Canadian law. In fact, we have found in our examin-
ation of Canadian bankruptcy law that Hesse would receive substantially
unequal treatment.
78
75. Eventually, however, there will be a uniform federal approach to the comity
decision. At a minimum, s.304 should produce a federal choice of law rule which will
replace the inconsistent attitude toward comity made possible by the Disconto decision,
supra n.14 and text accompanying. See Given and Vilaplana, "Comity Revisited: Multi-
national Bankruptcy Cases Under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code" (1983) Ariz.
St.L.J. 325, 331.
76. 28 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983). The Toga decision is supported in Gitlin
and Flaschen, op. cit. supra n.3, at p.321.
77. In re Toga Mfg. Co. 28 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
78. Idem, p.170.
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The Toga decision can be criticised for giving undue emphasis to only
one of the factors listed in section 304(c). Nevertheless, the same
emphasis on protection of American interests, articulated more subtly,
appears in litigation-In re Lineas Areas de Nicaragua SA 79 -involving
a financially troubled Nicaraguan airline. The foreign trustee initially
sought the transfer of all property located in the US and injunctive relief
against proceedings commenced, or to be commenced, against the
debtor. There were tangible assets worth approximately $200,000 plus a
valuable certificate authorising the debtor to operate flight services in
the US. This certificate was due to expire several months later. The
foreign trustee undertook that, although a transfer of assets was sought,
none of them would be removed from the US and they would be applied
primarily to satisfy American claims. The court ordered transfer of the
property to the Nicaraguan trustee on the basis of this undertaking and
on the further condition that the trustee be prohibited from incumber-
ing, assigning or abandoning assets located in the US. Subsequently,
corporate creditors moved for the appointment of an independent trus-
tee in the section 304 proceedings. The debtor's certificate of authority
had been extended for a few months. However, the Nicaraguan govern-
ment had indicated that it planned to cease supporting the existing ser-
vice and would attempt to replace the debtor with two other corporate
carriers. The reason for this action was that a potential financier of the
two new carriers preferred not to assume existing liabilities. Because of
this, the Nicaraguan trustee had no interest in preserving the debtor's
authorisation to operate air services in the US and, as the court noted,
planned to "do all he can to accomplish his government's wish to replace
the debtor by another carrier that has no obligation to US creditors".
The court therefore appointed a co-trustee to deal with this matter
because it felt that the major American creditor was entitled to a disin-
terested evaluation and presentation of its position before the American
licensing authority. This co-trustee was appointed solely to accomplish
this task and was given no responsibility or authority for the debtor's
assets other than as stated. 80
In re Culmer81 stands in apparent contrast to these decisions. The
court there approved the request of liquidators to transfer American
assets to the Bahamas over the strenuous objections of some creditors.
When the facts of this case are considered, however, the result from an
international perspective is only mildly encouraging. There was a close
79. 10 Bankr. 709 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
80. In re Lineas Areas de Nicaragua, SA 13 Bankr. 779 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981). These
two decisions are criticised for converting s.304 proceedings into a full American bank-
ruptcy. See Gallagher and Hartje, "The Effectiveness of s.304 in Achieving Efficient and
Economic Equity in Transnational Insolvency" (1983) Ann. Surv. Bankr. L. 1, 17, 19.
81. 25 Bankr. 624 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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substantive similarity between the two bankruptcy statutes. In addition,
the objecting creditors held liens which were avoidable under both
American and Bahamian law. Hence, the impairment of otherwise valid
domestic interests, a controlling consideration in Toga, was not present
in this case. Furthermore, the two major creditors in the US, each with a
claim greater than those held by all the creditors objecting to the
transfer, supported the position of the foreign representative.
There is also the Cunard 82 decision which authorised the transfer of
assets for administration in a Swedish bankruptcy. Even here, nonethe-
less, there is still need for caution in interpreting the opinion. Cunard, in
opposing the transfer, was attempting to protect a lien that would have
been vulnerable in a normal American bankruptcy. As the court noted:
The guiding premise of the Bankruptcy Code, like its predecessor, the
Bankruptcy Act, is the equality of the distribution of assets among credi-
tors ... Cunard is not a secured creditor of Salen, but a general creditor.
Cunard initiated this action and obtained the attachment after Salen had
filed its petition for bankruptcy...
In attaching these funds, Cunard has attempted to maintain a captive
fund to secure any ... award it may receive. There is, however, no com-
pelling policy reason for a general creditor ... to receive a preference
over other creditors. In the words of Judge Gurfein, writing for this court:
"The road to equity is not a race course for the swiftest" . .. It may be
added that, although Cunard does business and has a presence in the
United States, it is incorporated and based in England. Furthermore, the
contract [which gave rise to Cunard's claim] ...has no connection with
the United States and Salen is a Swedish business entity.
83
Only one conclusion can be drawn from all these decisions. There is
little reason to hope for co-operation from American courts in any but
the most routine and non-controversial situation. Optimism is not yet
justified.
VII. ABSTENTION AND RELATED JURISDICTIONAL MATTERS
PROCEEDINGS under section 304 have been available to foreign liquida-
tors for less than ten years. Courts have recently been asked to consider
whether use of this procedure is mandatory or, at least, preferable to
other courses of action. For example, in the Cunard litigation American
creditors argued that the foreign trustee could not assert a claim to com-
ity unless he first commenced section 304 proceedings. This delaying
tactic was unsuccessful. Even though the court believed that section 304
proceedings "would have been eminently proper" and "would have
82. Discussed supra at text accompanying nn. 10-12. Cunard looked to the factors enu-
merated in s.304(c) even though no s.304 proceedings had been commenced.
83. Cunard 773 F.2d 452, 459 (2nd Cir. 1985).
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been a preferred remedy" it was willing to consider the request for com-
ity without such a formality.
We do not find in the statute or in the legislative history a clear congress-
ional mandate, either express or implied, that section 304 was to be the
exclusive remedy for a foreign bankrupt. The statute is not phrased in
mandatory or exclusive terms, and the language of the accompanying
House and Senate Reports is permissive...
The ancillary proceeding was conceived as a more efficient and less
costly alternative to commencing a plenary proceeding which would be
duplicative of a foreign proceeding. Congress retained the option of com-
mencing a full bankruptcy case if the estate in the United States is substan-
tial or complicated enough to require a full case for proper administration
[emphasis added].84
In re Gee8 5 answers a related question: Does the filing of a petition
requesting a full American bankruptcy take precedence over a pre-
viously filed section 304 petition? The foreign representative in Gee had
chosen to proceed under section 304 following the commencement of
liquidation proceedings in the Grand Cayman Islands. He then sought
discovery and an injunction against the transfer of American assets.
Shortly before the hearing on his request for a preliminary injunction,
an official of the debtor, anxious to avoid discovery, filed a voluntary
petition on its behalf. He then argued that the full bankruptcy took pre-
cedence over the section 304 proceedings. This strategy, in what the
court termed "an international chess game", did not succeed. Section
305(a)(2) authorises dismissal or suspension of a normal bankruptcy if
"(A) there is pending a foreign proceeding; and (B) the factors specified
in 304(c) ...warrant such dismissal or suspension". The court, con-
vinced that the relief requested in the section 304 petition should be
granted, found that dismissal of the competing full bankruptcy was
proper.
Continuation of the Chapter 11 case is clearly not in keeping with the
spirit of section 305 which is designed in part to avoid duplication of effort
by the courts and creditors ... This court holds not that an existing
foreign liquidation precludes the filing of a Chapter 11 petition but rather
that where, as here, the court is recognizing a case filed ancillary to that
foreign proceeding as a means to effectively deal with the American assets
and creditors, if any, a competing Chapter 11 petition should be dismissed
under section 305.86
It should also be noted that section 306 of the Bankruptcy Code pro-
84. Idem, pp.455-456; Banca Emiliana v. Farinacci 812 F.2d 1469 (4th Cir. 1987)
agreed. Contra RBS Fabrics Ltd v. Beckers & La Hanne 24 Bankr. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
This aspect of Cunard is criticised in Sheehan, "Bankruptcy" (1986) 17 J. Mar. L. & Com.
445 and Case Comment, "Bankruptcy" (1986) 19 Vand.J.Transn.L. 911, 927-928.
85. Universal Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gee 53 Bankr. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
86. Idem, p.905.
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tects the foreign representative from one possible adverse consequence
of requesting judicial assistance in the US. An appearance in a bank-
ruptcy court for the purpose of requesting relief in either a full bank-
ruptcy or ancillary proceedings "does not submit such foreign
representative to the jurisdiction of any court in the United States for
any other purpose". 8 7 During the Herstatt bankruptcy in 1974-75, the
German liquidator failed to appear in the involuntary case which had
been commenced by American creditors, apparently fearing that this
appearance would prejudice the interests of the German estate.8 8 Sec-
tion 306 responds to this fear.
The protection is necessary to allow the foreign representative to present
his case and the case of the foreign estate, without waiving the normal jur-
isdictional rules of the foreign country. That is, creditors in this country
will still have to seek redress against the foreign estate according to the
host country's jurisdictional rules. Any other result would permit local
creditors to obtain unfair advantage by filing an involuntary case, thus
requiring the foreign representative to appear, and then obtaining local
jurisdiction over the representative in connection with his appearance in
this country. That kind of bankruptcy law would legalize an ambush tech-
nique that has frequently been rejected by the common law in other con-
texts.
89
To the extent that this fear is well founded, 90 section 306 increases the
relative attraction of using the bankruptcy process instead of pursuing
remedies provided by non-bankruptcy law.
VIII. CONCLUSION
There are few areas of the law in which international comity has made as
little progress as in bankruptcy. The call for an international bankruptcy
system based upon notions of comity and equality of creditors was first
voiced by nineteenth-century commentators . . . Subsequent efforts to
achieve those ends have been notably unsuccessful. If anything, the
United States has been less parochial and more accommodating than most
other countries (developed and developing), but even in this country prin-
ciples of international bankruptcy administration remain nascent and
primitive. 91
Does this bleak assessment of past achievements accurately predict
future development? One hopes not. 92 The enactment of section 304
87. 11 U.S.C. 506 (1983).
88. Becker, "International Insolvency: The Case of Herstatt" (1976) 62 A.B.A.J. 1292,
1294.
89. S.Rep. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1978).
90. See Nadelmann, op. cit. supra n.26, at pp.7-8 n.37.
91. Warren and Westbrook, The Law of Debtors and Creditors (1986), p. 7 2 1 .
92. For a recent English decision, similarly unwilling to promote international co-oper-
ation when this would prejudice local interests, see Felixstowe Dock and Railway Co. v.
US Lines Inc. (1987) LEXIS (O.B.D., Commercial Court).
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provides an opportunity to move toward a more international orien-
tation in the administration of cross-border insolvencies. Various levels
of co-operation are possible, not all involving the same degree of con-
flict between domestic and foreign interests. At a minimum, use of sec-
tion 304 should be possible whenever a liquidation or reorganisation is
taking place outside the US. Foreign proceedings will go forward in any
event. The presence of parallel section 304 proceedings in the US will
facilitate the development of a uniform federal policy relating to the rec-
ognition of rights arising under foreign bankruptcy statutes.
It can also be hoped that American judges will be flexible in respond-
ing to requests for relief in pending section 304 proceedings. While there
may possibly be situations in which the commencement of a full Ameri-
can case is the preferred procedure, courts should not routinely deny
requests for relief (e.g. recovery of preferences) simply on the ground
that the section 304 proceedings are not the equivalent of a normal
bankruptcy.
Requests for the transfer of assets abroad will present the most direct
and substantial conflict between interests of American and foreign
creditors. Judges are not yet ready to relinquish control over American
assets in any but the most routine cases. It is unlikely that this attitude
will change dramatically in the immediate future.
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